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COALITION ADVOCATING LEGAL HOUSING OPTIONS v. CITY OF SANTA MONICA
88 Cal. App. 4th 451, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 802 (2001)
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY:
As Modified on Denial of
Rehearing April 11, 2001, Reported at: 2001
Cal. App. LEXIS 277. The Publication Status of this Document has been
changed from Unpublished to Published April 11, 2001.
PRIOR HISTORY:
APPEAL from a judgment of
the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BS
053199. Robert H. O'Brien, Judge.
DISPOSITION:
Reversed and remanded with
directions.
JUDGES:
BOLAND, J. * We concur: LILLIE,
P.J. WOODS, J. * LILLIE, P.J. WOODS, J. BOLAND, J. **
* Judge of the Los Angeles
Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6
of the California Constitution.
** Judge of the Los Angeles
Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6
of the California Constitution.
OPINIONBY:
BOLAND
OPINION:
[*454] [***803]
INTRODUCTION
This lawsuit,
brought by the Coalition [**2]
Advocating Legal Housing Options and Lou Moench, challenges the
constitutionality of a Santa Monica zoning ordinance. The ordinance allows the
creation of "second units" in single-family residential zones, but
only if the person occupying the second unit is the property owner or his/her
dependent, or a caregiver for the property owner or dependent. Since the
ordinance's distinction among permissible users of second units violates both
privacy and equal protection rights under established constitutional
principles, the judgment upholding the ordinance must be reversed.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A second unit is an attached
or detached unit that provides complete independent living facilities for one
or more persons. The zoning ordinance under review was passed because of a
state law encouraging local agencies to permit the creation of second units in
single- and multiple-family zones. The statute authorizes such local
ordinances, and indeed requires local
agencies to permit second units meeting state-set standards unless the locality
either (1) passes its own ordinance providing for such units which may have
requirements stricter than the state standards, or [**3] (2) totally precludes them in single-family
or multiple-family zoned areas. (Govt. Code, §
65852.2.) But a locality cannot totally preclude second units unless its
ordinance contains findings that the ban is justified by specific adverse impacts on the public health, safety and welfare
that would result from allowing second units. (Id. at subd. (c).) The state's statute on second units was originally
enacted in 1982, with legislative findings that, inter alia, there was a
tremendous unmet need for new housing and many benefits associated with
creation of second-family residential units on existing single-family lots.
These included providing a cost-effective means of serving development of
housing through use of existing infrastructures, providing relatively
affordable housing without public subsidy, providing a means for purchasers to
meet payments on high interest loans, and providing security for homeowners.
(Stats. 1982, ch. 1440, § 1.)
[*455]
[***804] The statute was amended
in 1994. The amendment's legislative history indicates that local governments
had responded to the existing law either by embracing second units as a source
of affordable housing, or by discouraging their creation [**4] through complicated and expensive
application procedures or other means. (Assem. Com. on Housing & Community
Development, Analysis of A.B. 3198 (1993-1994 Sess.) as amended May 4, 1994, p.
4.) The amendment imposed new requirements on local jurisdictions, including
limits on the size and parking requirements that could be imposed for second
units. (Govt. Code, § 65852.2, subd.
(d) & (e).) It also specifically declared the Legislature's intent that
"any second-unit ordinances adopted by local agencies have the effect of
providing for the creation of second units," and that provisions of such
ordinances "are not so arbitrary, excessive, or burdensome so as to
unreasonably restrict the ability of homeowners to create second units in zones
in which they are authorized by local ordinance." (Govt. Code, § 65852.150.)
The City of
Santa Monica (the City) received its first application for a second unit in
June 1996, 13 years after the initial state law went into effect. Under state
law, the City then had 120 days to pass its own ordinance, either providing for
creation of second units or totally precluding them. Alternatively, the City
would be required to grant a permit for the second [**5] unit if the application complied with state
statutory requirements. (Govt. Code, §
65852.2, subd. (b)(1).)
The staff of
the City Council recommended that the Council direct the staff to prepare an
ordinance creating local standards regulating second units. The staff's report
advised that the City's then-current prohibition on second units in R-1 single
family districts "does not meet the requirements of State law." n1
The report said that the staff did not believe that specific findings
justifying a prohibition could be made. n2 The staff's report also included a
copy of a 1990 publication from the State Department of Housing and Community
Development, indicating that a local ordinance limiting occupancy to persons
related to the owner would be susceptible to legal challenge.
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n1 In 1988,
Santa Monica's City Attorney had given the City Council similar advice, opining
that the City's zoning ordinance prohibiting second units in R-1 districts was
based on findings that were "legally indefensible," and that the
prohibition was therefore unlawful.
n2 The staff's
report pointed out that Santa Monica's infrastructure was adequate to support
development of additional units, particularly in single family areas; that
single family areas generally had the lowest traffic volumes of any area in the
City; and that additional impacts from a modest rate of second unit development
could be absorbed without significant effects.
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The Council
held a public hearing on August 13, 1996, and accepted the staff's
recommendation, and directed staff to prepare an ordinance regulating [*456]
second units. The staff did so, and presented it to the Council at its
meeting on September 24, 1996, again stating its view that there was not
sufficient evidence to adopt the findings necessary for a ban of second units.
The Planning Commission had also voted unanimously to recommend an ordinance
legalizing second unit creation in R-1 zones.
Some 24 members
of the public spoke at the September hearing, the majority opposing the
proposal and supporting a ban on second units. The speakers opined that second
units would mean more congestion, air pollution, noise, traffic, and on-street
parking; would add to the burden on the water supply, trash disposal, and
schools; and would divert police resources from other areas to handle the
increased crime in R-1 neighborhoods.
After
discussion, the Council rejected the staff's recommendation and instructed the
staff to prepare new recommendations for adoption of an ordinance that
would [***805] prohibit rental units in the R-1 area, with
the appropriate findings. The staff was also asked to evaluate [**7] whether any limited hardship exceptions
should be included in such an ordinance.
The Council
held a hearing on October 8, 1996, on a revised ordinance. The proposed
ordinance prohibited second units in R-1 districts, with a limited exception
for second units used for the owner's child or parent in cases of substantial
hardship. There were 20 speakers, and again most opposed second units. Two
speakers asked for a modification to expand the exception to include relatives
and household help.
After discussion,
the Council voted four to three to adopt Interim Ordinance 1866, allowing
second units only for use by dependents/caregivers rather than only
parent/child, with a requirement for a demonstration of substantial hardship
and a specific prohibition against renting the unit. The following month the
ordinance was extended for 18 months.
A similar
interim ordinance (Ordinance No. 1916) was introduced and passed four to three
on June 9, 1998. It eliminated the hardship requirement, permitting second
units intended and used solely for occupancy by dependents or caregivers. The
ordinance also contained regulations governing lot size, density, maximum and
minimum unit size, parcel coverage,
[**8] parking requirements,
design standards and other requirements for second units.
Before the
scheduled expiration in June 1999 of Interim Ordinance No. 1916, the Planning
Commission recommended that the Council take a different approach to second
units by controlling them through either density or concentration regulations.
At the Council's meeting on April 27, 1999, the staff [*457] presented
alternative ordinances for the Council's consideration, one to extend the
interim ordinance temporarily, and the other to enact the same standards
permanently. The staff recommended that the Council extend the interim
ordinance to allow the opportunity to explore the alternatives proposed by the
Planning Commission.
Again, most of
the speakers at the Council's meeting opposed second units, and the Council
adopted the permanent ordinance (Ordinance No. 1942) on May 11, 1999, by a five
to two vote. n3
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n3 The word
"solely" was eliminated from the permanent ordinance, to make clear
that, for example, a caregiver's spouse or children could live with him/her in
a second unit.
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Meanwhile, in
September 1998, shortly after the adoption of Interim Ordinance No. 1916, the
Coalition and Moench, a member of the Coalition and former member of the
Planning Commission, filed a petition for writ of mandate. The petition sought
a writ requiring the City Council to cease enforcement of the
dependent/caregiver provision of Ordinance No. 1916 or to adopt an ordinance
eliminating it, and to process otherwise eligible permit applications without
regard to intent or use of the second unit. After the trial court indicated
that alternative forms of relief might be more appropriate, the petition was
amended to add a claim for declaratory and injunctive relief. The petition was
later deemed amended so as to challenge the permanent ordinance (Ordinance No.
1942) upon its enactment.
The matter was
heard on July 9, 1999, after filing of supplemental papers, including lengthy
transcripts of the public hearings. After brief oral argument, the court took
the matter under submission, and a few days later issued a minute order denying
the petition, without analysis.
This appeal
followed.
DISCUSSION
A. The municipal
affairs doctrine does not apply.
The City argues as a
preliminary [**10] matter that, as a
charter city, it is not required to comply with the state statute on second
units, under the "municipal affairs"
[***806] doctrine. That doctrine
says that a charter city's ordinances relating to purely municipal affairs
prevail over state laws on the same subject.
The City is
incorrect. In the first place, while the City's response to the petition
asserted the municipal affairs doctrine as a defense, the City did not [*458]
raise the issue in its briefs to the trial court, and it is not
appropriate to raise it for the first time on appeal. In the second place, if a
matter is of statewide concern, charter cities must yield to applicable general
state laws. ( Baggett v. Gates (1982) 32
Cal. 3d 128, 136, 185 Cal. Rptr. 232, 649 P.2d 874.) The Legislature has
expressly declared housing to be a matter of statewide concern (e.g., Govt.
Code, § 65580, subd. (a)
["availability of housing is of vital statewide importance"]; see
Govt. Code, § 65852.150 ["second
units are a valuable form of housing in California"]), as have the courts.
( Buena Vista Gardens Apartments Assn. v.
City of San Diego Planning Dept. (1985) 175 Cal. App. 3d 289, 306-307, 220 Cal.
Rptr. 732 [**11] (citing cases).)
Santa Monica is required to comply with section 65852.2, as it recognizes in
the introductory words to its own ordinance.
B. The occupancy limitation in the ordinance
violates the right to privacy guaranteed by the California Constitution.
The Coalition's
first argument is that, by limiting residents of second units based on familial
relationships, the user provisions of the City's ordinance violate the right of
privacy under the California Constitution, as described in City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson (1980) 27 Cal. 3d 123, 164 Cal. Rptr.
539, 610 P.2d 436. We agree, as it is difficult to see any principled
distinction between that case and this.
In Adamson, the Supreme Court invalidated
an ordinance which prevented unrelated groups of more than five persons from
occupying a home in a single-family zone. This prevented a group of 12 adults
from living in a 24-room, 10-bedroom house owned by one of them. The question
posed by the court was whether a law to promote and protect family values
"may deny to individuals who are not family members certain benefits that
family members enjoy." ( City of
Santa Barbara v. Adamson, supra, 27 Cal. 3d at p. 128.) [**12] The court said that the California
constitutional right to privacy required that any incursion into individual
privacy, such as Santa Barbara's restriction on communal living, be justified
by a compelling public interest. ( Id. at
p. 131.) The ordinance's goal of "preservation of a residential
environment" was not advanced by the "rule-of-five." The court
was "not persuaded" that a residential environment was in fact
dependent on a blood, marriage or adoption relationship among the residents of
a house. ( Id. at p. 132.) The
rule-of-five was "not pertinent to noise, traffic or parking congestion,
kinds of activity, or other conditions that conceivably might alter the
land-use-related 'characteristics' or 'environment' of the districts." ( Id. at pp. 132-133.)
The court
concluded that the city's stated goals could be enhanced by means less
restrictive of freedom than the rule-of-five, such as reference to [*459]
floor space and facilities and limitations on the number of cars applied
evenly to all households, and that "[i]n general, zoning ordinances are much less
suspect when they focus on the use than when they command inquiry into [**13]
who are the users." ( Id.
at p. 133, emphasis in original; see also Park Redlands Covenant Control Committee v. Simon (1986) 181 Cal. App. 3d
87, 96-97, 226 Cal. Rptr. 199 [invalidating covenant limiting number of
occupants of house to three on privacy grounds].)
This case is
only a step removed from Adamson:
Santa Monica's ordinance does not control who may live in the main residence on
a single-family lot, but does control
[***807] who may live in an
independent part of the main residence (if attached) or in close proximity to
it (if detached). Unless we are to say that a second unit is not a part of
one's home, personal decisions about who may live in the second unit are no
less entitled to privacy protection than decisions about who may live together
in the main residence.
In short, the
right to privacy includes the right to be left alone in our homes. ( City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, supra, 27
Cal. 3d at p. 130.) If there is a privacy right to choose with whom to live
in the main residence, that same principle must apply to the right to decide
who may live in the second unit, because the second unit, while allowing
independent [**14] living, is still a
part of the home. As Adamson warned,
a zoning ordinance requiring inquiry into the identity of the user is suspect.
( Id. at p. 133.) Government may
legitimately decide whether second units may be constructed in particular
zones, but may not determine who may live in them.
The City argues
that Adamson is no longer good law,
because more recent decisions have modified the privacy standard, particularly
the requirement for a "compelling interest" justifying an intrusion
into privacy. The City cites Hill v.
National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal. 4th 1, 865 P.2d 633 [state
constitutional right of privacy applies to private, as well as to state,
action; NCAA drug testing program does not violate that right]. But the Hill standards offer the City no solace
either, as decisions following Hill
make it clear that the result in Adamson
remains unchanged.
It is true that
Hill concluded that not every
assertion of a privacy interest must be overcome by a compelling interest;
where the privacy interest is less central or in bona fide dispute, general
balancing tests may be employed. ( National
Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Hill, supra, 7 Cal. 4th at p. 34.) [**15] Hill
identified three threshold elements for establishing a violation of the right
to [*460] privacy under the California Constitution -- a legally protected
privacy interest, a reasonable expectation of privacy, and a serious invasion
of privacy -- and said that a privacy invasion must be evaluated by the extent
to which it furthers legitimate and competing interests. ( Id. at pp. 35-38.) And, if legitimate objectives can be readily
accomplished by alternative means with little or no privacy impact, "the
prospect of actionable invasion of privacy is enhanced." ( Id. at p. 38.)
Applying those
standards does not change the result in Adamson,
or here, and the City is mistaken when it argues that Adamson is "inapposite." Indeed, in subsequent cases the
Supreme Court emphasized that Hill
"should not be interpreted as establishing significant new requirements or hurdles that a
plaintiff must meet" [emphasis in original], or as a departure from
decisions -- specifically including Adamson
-- that "uniformly hold that when a challenged practice or conduct
intrudes upon a constitutionally protected privacy interest, the interests or
justifications [**16] supporting the
challenged practice must be weighed or balanced against the intrusion on
privacy imposed by the practice." ( Loder
v. City of Glendale (1997) 14 Cal. 4th 846, 891, 927 P.2d 1200.)
In Loder, the court cited Adamson among others, specifically
noting its holding that an intrusion on a resident's privacy interest in living
with unrelated persons is not justified by governmental interests underlying
the local zoning ordinance. Loder
went on to say that "nothing in Hill
suggests that the court intended to reject the constitutional analysis applied
in all of these cases." ( Loder v.
City of Glendale, supra, at p. 892.) The court explained that the three
threshold elements identified in Hill
merely permit courts "to weed out claims that involve so insignificant or
de minimis [***808] an intrusion on a constitutionally protected
privacy interest as not even to require an explanation or justification by the
defendant." ( Id. at p. 893.) Loder was clear that Hill did not adopt "a sweeping new rule" under which a challenge
to conduct that significantly affects a privacy interest may be rejected
without considering [**17] "the
legitimacy or strength" of the justification for it. (14
Cal. 4th at pp. 893-894.)
It is clear
from Adamson that the right to choose
with whom to live is fundamental -- not "so insignificant or de minimis an
intrusion" as to require no justification -- and nothing in any subsequent
case suggests otherwise. The suggestion that this right may be curtailed when
the home is [*461] constructed with independent living facilities
included is unpersuasive. n4 The Hill threshold
requirements are plainly met.
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n4 The
ordinance would prevent a non-dependent adult child or relative, as well
unrelated persons, from occupying a second unit, so the ordinance intrudes on
familial decisions as well. We note that Hill
cited "the freedom to pursue consensual familial relationships" as
one of those vital privacy interests that are "fundamental to personal
autonomy" and require the presence of a compelling interest to overcome
the privacy interest. ( Hill v. National
Collegiate Athletic Assn., supra, 7 Cal. 4th at p. 34.)
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The City says
it has legitimate countervailing interests to justify the occupancy restriction,
such as preservation of the character of single family neighborhoods, reduction
of noise, traffic and crime, and ensuring adequate parking. But, as in Adamson, it is difficult to see how the
exclusion of unrelated persons and non-dependent family members from second
units, while permitting dependents and caregivers, advances the preservation of
the character of the neighborhood, or is pertinent to noise, traffic, crime or
parking congestion. ( City of Santa
Barbara v. Adamson, supra, 27 Cal. 3d at 132-133.) n5
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n5 The City
apparently fears an "undue concentration" of second units, which it
found would not occur if occupancy were restricted to dependents and caregivers.
But the only evidence in the record suggested there would not be many second
units under any scenario. The City's
own Housing Element Update for 1998 - 2003 said that, even if the City's second
unit ordinance were liberalized, "it is unlikely that second units would
have a significant impact on the new housing stock during this planning
period." The report explained that the majority of such requests for
second units would likely be to legalize existing "bootleg" units
"and not for the construction of new housing units." The staff said,
in response to council-member questions, that information from other cities
which have allowed second units was that there were not a significant number of second units established. And, the City
Council was advised in 1988 that it could alleviate any concern about
proliferation of second units by establishing a yearly limit on the number of
permits which could be issued in the R-1 district. There was also a reference
to American Planning Association statistics suggesting an expected range of one
to three second units per thousand R-1 homes per year.
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Using the Hill analysis, if legitimate objectives
can be readily accomplished by alternative means with little or no privacy
impact, the likelihood of an actionable invasion of privacy is increased. ( Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn.,
supra, 7 Cal. 4th at p. 38.) Here, there are alternative means with no
privacy impact, as the City Council was repeatedly advised by its own staff and
the Planning Commission. Those include limitations on numbers of permits issued
as well as size, density, structural, parking and other requirements already in
the City's ordinance. In sum, consideration of either "the legitimacy or
strength" of the City's justification for the restriction on occupancy of
second units makes the balance clear: the privacy intrusion effected by the
ordinance violates the California Constitution.
[*462]
C. The occupancy limitation in the ordinance violates California equal
protection principles.
The City's
ordinance effectively classifying permissible users of second [***809]
units also violates the equal protection clause of the California
Constitution.
The City correctly
observes that its zoning powers are broad and that courts must defer to
[**20] legislative judgments where the
validity of a zoning ordinance is fairly debatable.
Of course that is so; courts
must give legislative findings great weight and uphold them unless they are
arbitrary and unreasonable. But even if the classification of permissible
occupiers of the second unit did not infringe as it does on a fundamental
right, it must bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. ( Elysium Institute, Inc. v. County of Los
Angeles (1991) 232 Cal. App. 3d 408, 427-428, 432, 283 Cal. Rptr. 688
[distinction between nudist camps and recreational clubs, restricting former to
A-2 zone, bears no rational relationship to a conceivable legitimate purpose].)
The ordinance fails that test as well. n6
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n6 Because we
invalidate the occupancy limitation on constitutional grounds, we need not consider
the Coalition's additional claims that the ordinance violates the state statute
on second units and the State's Fair Employment and Housing Act.
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The City argues
that its objective [**21] is to
preserve the "character and integrity of single family neighborhoods"
and avoid an undue concentration of population and traffic. These are certainly
legitimate legislative goals, but it is difficult to see how the status of the
occupier of a second unit -- an unrelated renter versus a dependent or
caregiver who is allowed to pay rent -- bears any relationship to either one.
The City's own
housing element shows that neighborhood character has nothing to do with the
identity of the person using the second unit. n7 The housing element
specifically undertakes to clarify the terms "neighborhood character"
and "neighborhood quality," so that there will be a "common
understanding" on which to base the City's neighborhood preservation policy.
And it is clear these terms do not refer to the residents of the neighborhood.
The "key component" of neighborhood character is "recurring
building patterns" within given neighborhoods, and these patterns are
defined by such key variables as lot size, lot development patterns and [*463]
density, open space and lot coverage, building setbacks, height and
architecture, and the rate of new development in those neighborhoods. (City of
Santa Monica Housing [**22] Element, at
II-67 to II-68.) Notably, the second units allowed by the City must meet
specific requirements in virtually all these categories.
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n7 The record
contains selected portions of the City's housing element and the City requests
that the court take judicial notice of inadvertently omitted portions of the
housing element. The omitted portion notes that one of the City's primary
housing goals seeks to preserve the quality and character of its existing
single and multiple-family residential neighborhoods, and discusses the meaning
and importance of the City's neighborhood preservation policy. The City's
request for judicial notice is granted.
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Nor does the
occupancy restriction bear any rational relationship to the legislative goal of
preventing undue concentration of population and traffic. The circumstances
here are indistinguishable in principle from those in College Area Renters & Landlord Assn. v. City of San Diego (1996)
43 Cal. App. 4th 677. There, the court invalidated, on equal protection
[**23] grounds, an ordinance that
distinguished between tenant-occupants and owner-occupants of detached
dwellings in single-family residential neighborhoods. The ordinance was
designed to address nuisance problems associated with non-owner occupied
rentals, including overcrowding, lack of parking, excessive noise, and
inadequate maintenance "which adversely affects the character of one-family
residential zones." ( Id. at p.680.)
It regulated the number of persons over age 18 who could live in a
non-owner-occupied residence based on square footage, number of bathrooms and
parking facilities, but no such occupancy restriction applied to owner-residents.
( Id. at p. 681, 50 Cal. [***810] Rptr. 2d 515.) The court
could "perceive of no justification for making a distinction between the
two types of detached dwelling residents," and said that if the city
wanted to address problems associated with overcrowded detached homes, it
should do so with a law applying evenly to all households. ( Id. at p. 687.)
Here, as to
second units in single-family residential neighborhoods, the ordinance
similarly distinguishes between tenant-occupants who are not dependents/caregivers
and owner-occupants [**24] and/or their
dependents/caregivers. It not only regulates but completely prohibits the
former while permitting the latter. As in College
Area Renters, if the city wants to avoid an "undue concentration of
population and traffic" expected to be caused by second units, it should
do so with an ordinance applying evenly to all households.
The City argues
that because it could have banned second units entirely, it therefore may
restrict their use. For one thing, it is questionable whether the City's
findings, based not on population or traffic or any other kind of studies, but
solely on opinions expressed by residents of R-1 districts, could constitute
the required statutory findings that a total ban is justified by "specific adverse impacts on the public
health, safety, and welfare that would
result from allowing second units within single-family and multifamily [*464]
zoned areas ...." n8 (Govt. Code, § 65852.2, subd. (c) [emphasis added].) Assuming the City made or could
make appropriate findings to ban second units, it cannot ban them selectively
in a manner violating constitutional rights.
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n8 The City
Council also found that a substantial number of second units already exist in
R-1 neighborhoods, either built as accessory units not permitted for dwelling
or built without permits. None of this substantial number of owners (except the
original permit applicant) spoke at any of the public hearings.
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D. The remedy for the constitutional violations is
severance of the occupancy limitation.
The City argues
that if the Coalition prevails, the appropriate remedy is "severance of
the exemption for dependents and caregivers," which it says "would
leave in place a prohibition against second units in the R-1 zone."
However, the Coalition did not seek that remedy, and it is not appropriate for
the court to decide what the Council would have done if it had not passed the
ordinance under review.
The ordinance
amends a number of sections of the City's Municipal Code to provide, in
considerable detail, for second units, and in a single sentence (Muni. Code,
§ 9.04.13.040, subd. (a)) restricts
their occupancy. The Coalition challenged only that restriction, and section 13
of the ordinance itself specifies that if any "section, subsection,
sentence, clause, or phrase" is held unconstitutional, that decision "shall
not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this Ordinance." It
is proper for a reviewing court to correct a discriminatory classification by
invalidating only the invidious exception ( In
re Kapperman (1974) 11 Cal. 3d 542, 550, 114 Cal. Rptr. 97, 522 P.2d 657),
[**26] and that is what we do here.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is
reversed and the case remanded to the trial court with directions to enter a
new and different judgment declaring unconstitutional and enjoining enforcement
of the occupancy limitations contained in section 9.04.13.040, subd. (a), of
the Santa Monica Municipal Code. Appellants shall recover their costs on
appeal.
BOLAND, J. n9
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n9 Judge of the
Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article
VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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We concur:
LILLIE, P.J.
WOODS, J.